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In determining the nature and location of a boundary the
intention of the parties originally making the line will control.'
To truly determine this intent it is necessary to obtain the same
knowledge of the subject matter of the deed as was in the posses-
sion of the parties thereto at the time of its execution.2
This makes the introduction of extrinsic evidence necessary,
not to vary the terms of the deed, but to arrive at the true mean-
ing, as in a case where the description of the boundaries is gen-
eral, or ambiguous. 3 But where the intention can be arrived at,
without the introduction of extrinsic evidence, by application of
legal rules and logic it need not be considered. For instance, if
a call is inconsistent with the rest of the deed, and its rejection
would reconcile all the other calls, the coult will assume that it
was inadvertently inserted, and will reject it.4
In analyzing a deed it is often found that there is a conflict
in every call between certain elements of the call. In such
a situation the Kentucky court has laid down the rule
that distances yield to courses, and both courses and distances
yield to natural objects, and in this connection, a boundary
line of a named adjoining owner is a fixed natural object.5 South
Carolina has stated the rule somewhat differently by saying
that in locating lands the following rules are resorted to, and
generally in the order stated: (1) Natural boundaries; (2) Arti-
ficial marks; (3) Adjacent boundaries; (4) Course and distance.
Neither rule, however, occupies an inflexible position; for, when
it is plain that there is a mistake, an inferior means of location
1 gullivan v. Hill, 33 R. I. 962; McKinney v. McKinney, 8 Ohio St.
423; Cooperative Building Bank v. Hawkins, 30 R. I. 171; Thatcher v.
Howland, 2 Mete. (Mass.) 41.
2 Murley v. McDermott (1838), 8 Ad. & El. 138; Van .Dieman's Land
Co. v. Table Cape Marine Board (1906), A. C. 92, P. C. at p. 98.
:Lister v. Pickford (1865), 34 Beav. 576.
4 Morse v. Rogers, 118 Mass. 572; McDowell v. Carothers, 75 Or. 126,
131; 2ellman v. Sellman (Tex.), 73 S. W. 48; Newbold v. Condon-, 104
Md. 100; Thatcher v. Howland, supra; Robinson v. Kime, 70 N. Y. 147;
Waterman v. Andrews, 14 R. I. 684; White v. Luning, 93 U. S. 514.
5Fidelity Realty Co. v. Flahaven Land Co., 23 S. W. 260, 193 Ky.
855.
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may control a higher.0 Maps, ancient surveys and reputation
may also be considered.
7
It sometimes happens that it is uncertain which of two
monuments is intended. In that case course and distance will
control, or where a monument is lacking, and the course is un-
certain that course may be adopted which most nearly yields the
desired quantity.8
Where the call is from one known and ascertained point to
another, without naming any intervening points or corners, a
straight line is presumed,9 but this presumption may be rebutted
by accompanying language, such as, "along the old line," or "as
the line runs," in which case the word line has been interpreted
to mean all the twists and turns of the old line between the
points, which is in effect, saying that the word line may mean a
a number of corners and lines. This is in accord with common
usage.' 0
Where the plots, concerning which there is a boundary dis-
pute, were originally held by one party, who divided them, the
deed of the plot which was first granted will fix the line, in case
that deed can be interpreted with reasonable certainty.'1
In accord with these rules three cases were recently decided
in Kentucky.
I. Petrey v. Adkins, 200 Ky. 463. Both parties claimed
thru grants from A. The tenth call read, "Thence crossing the
road east with the old line to the corner in the gap of the ridge
between Mud and Cain Creeks." The eleventh call ran: "Thence
north to A's old corner, a white oak." There were two gaps.
To arrive at the second gap several lines would have to be in-
cluded. To comply with the eleventh call the second gap would
have to be accepted, which would be in accord with the original
6 Fuwood v. Graham (S. C. 1845), I Rich. Law 491; Allen v. Kersey,
104 Ind. 1, 3 N. E. 557.
Penny Pot Landing v. Philadelphia, 16 Pa. St. 79.
3Allen v. Kersey, supra.
9 Lyon v. Ross (Ky.), 1 Bibb. 466.
"D Bell v. Powers (Ky.) 121 S. W. 991, 993; Cubberly v. Oubberly, 12
N. J. L. (7 Haist) 308, 314; Tallahassee Power Co. v. garage (N. 0.)
87 S. E. 629.
Collins v. Clough, 71 At. 1077, 222 Pa. 472; Bryant v. Terry, 189
Ky. 489; Bell v. Powers (Ky.), 121 S. W. 991.
BoUNDAmsS
grant of the parceL The defendant contended for the second
gap, and was sustained by the court.
II. Johnson v. Thornberry, 200 Ky. 665. One call read:
"Beginning at the splash dam, and running up the left point to
the'top of the ridge, James King's line; thence south with the
top of the ridge to a spur, to the forks of Ellis Lick." There
were two spurs. The grantors of both parties derived title from
the original divider of the tracts. The defendant's deed was the
oldest, and was followed by the court in stopping the line at
the first spur, and in inserting "thence" in the deed between "a
spur" and "to the forks."
III. Green v. Witten, 200 Ky. 725. There was a variance
between the calls for monuments, and the calls for courses and
distances, and there was also a dispute as to the location of
"Dogwood Gap." The defendants contended tblat the line
should be run from monument to monument. The plaintiffs
wished the courses to be followed. The testimony of neighbors
was introduced to give the exact location of "Dogwood Gap."
The monuments controlled.'
2
12 Eliott v. Jefferson, 133 N. Ca. 207, 64 L. R. A. 135; Logan v. WarnZ,
58 W. Va. 366.
Another rule was laid down in this case which has not been
discussed. It was said that the burden of proof as to boundaries
is on the party suing to quiet title, and where the proof is doubt-
ful it must be determined in favor of the defendant.
J. W. GmLoN, JB.
